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Is Owning your Home Good for your Health? Evidence from 
exogenous variations in subsidies in England 
 
 
 
Abstract  
Home ownership is an important component of wealth and may affect health through a range 
of mechanisms. Using macro- and micro-level data from 2000 to 2008, we seek to estimate 
the causal effect of home ownership on health by exploiting the Right to Buy policy, which 
encouraged long-term tenants of publicly rented housing to buy their home at a large discount. 
At the macro-level we find that a 10 percentage-point increase in home ownership rates is 
associated with a 2 percentage-point reduction in the number of people reporting having a 
longstanding health condition. At the individual level we find that home ownership increases 
the General Health Questionnaire score by 1.46 points on a 37-point scale and self-assessed 
health by 0.19 points on a 5-point scale and reduces the number of health conditions reported 
by 0.65. Further analyses show that home ownership affects health via labour markets, with 
new job opportunities, extra time saved travelling and resources available for healthy leisure 
activities. These results suggest that housing policies, such as affordable housing, can be an 
example of non-health policies that improve health. 
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1. Introduction  
Home ownership is a sizable component of wealth in Western economies, but is it also 
important for health? Housing wealth represents 60% of the financial wealth of households in 
Britain (Banks et al., 2003), and equity extraction from unsold homes reached 6-8% of total 
household income in the mid-2000s (Reinold, 2011). Such wealth gains have an ambiguous 
effect on health depending on the relative size of the substitution and wealth effects. Fichera 
and Gathergood (2016) find that house price gains improve physical health. However, home 
ownership could also have detrimental effects on health if home owners become anxious 
about keeping up with mortgage payments (Nettleton and Burrows, 2000; Evans et al., 2003). 
 
Another potential channel through which home ownership could impact on health is via labour 
markets (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2013; Laamanen, 2017; Oswald, 1996). Blanchflower and 
Oswald (2013) found that a doubling of the home ownership rate was associated with more 
than a doubling of the long-run unemployment rate. Longer commuting times, which may be 
a result of home ownership, have also been found to reduce well-being and reduce health-
related quality of life (Munford et al., 2015).  
 
Nonetheless, home ownership could improve health through better housing conditions. There 
is evidence of a detrimental effect of poor housing conditions (e.g. temperature and humidity) 
on respiratory health (Marmot et al., 2008; Shaw, 2004). As home owners can make structural 
adjustments to their dwellings, home ownership could improve housing quality and, therefore, 
health (Haurin et al., 2002; Chapman, 2013). Home ownership could also impact psychological 
health through social comparisons, by providing people with a sense of physical and emotional 
security, control over their life and safety (Elsinga et al., 2008), and social capital through 
increased participation in church and community organisations (Homenuck, 1973), 
neighbourhood and block associations and socialisation (Rohe and Stegman, 1994; Fischer, 
1982), and political activity (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2000). 
 
Whilst there is some evidence that housing is associated with health (Parliamentary Office of 
Science and Technology, 2011; Buck et al., 2016; Marmot et al., 2010), there is little causal 
evidence about the effect of home ownership on health (Dietz and Haurin, 2003). Establishing 
a causal relation between health and home ownership is difficult because healthier individuals 
might select into home ownership and because home ownership rates might simply capture 
area-level factors, such as unemployment rates and possibly other omitted factors, affecting 
both health and ownership.  
 
We exploit variations in government house purchase subsidies in England under a policy 
called ‘Right to Buy’. These discounts, representing more than 76% of an average yearly 
salary, constituted a substantial incentive to buy a home. This policy increased home 
ownership as a share of housing tenure by 15 percentage points and generated the largest 
contribution to privatisation revenue in the UK. It represents an exceptional home-ownership 
intervention in international terms, though the Israeli government introduced similar reforms in 
2000 (Hausman, Ramot-Nyska and Zussman, 2020). Nonetheless, it has not been analysed 
much by economists, except for two studies examining its effects on the quality and quantity 
of publicly-provided houses and on mobility using the British Household Panel Survey (Disney 
and Luo, 2017; van Ham et al, 2013). 
 
We examine the effect of home ownership on health with macro and micro level panel data 
using either Local Authorities or individuals as our observational units. We find that home 
ownership improves physical and psychological health. We explore potential mechanisms and 
find that the health effects of home ownership operate through labour markets, with home 
owners more likely to become employed and spend less time travelling to work. Home owners 
also spend more money on leisure and are less likely to smoke and suffer from lifestyle-related 
diseases.  
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2. Literature review 
 
Our paper is closely related to two existing themes of literature: (1) the ways in which housing 
more generally affects health and (2) the effects of exogenous variations in wealth on health. 
We summarise each in turn below. 
 
 
2.1 Channels through which home ownership could affect health 
 
How does home ownership affect health? In economic models, health is produced by human 
capital investments, lifestyle behaviours and other random shocks, and it can be influenced 
by socioeconomic factors such as income and wealth (Grossman, 1972). Assume that 
individuals maximise a utility function with health and consumption of other goods subject to 
time and budget constraints. In this case, individuals will allocate time and resources for health 
investments to equalize the marginal utility to the marginal cost. In such a model, wealth gains 
behave like permanent income shocks shifting the budget constraint out and affecting health.  
 
However, there are at least five reasons why the direction of this relation is ambiguous. First, 
there is a direct effect of home ownership on health through housing conditions. Disney and 
Luo (2017) showed that the Right to Buy lowered housing quality for residual public renters 
who did not partake in the scheme. There is evidence of a detrimental effect of poor housing 
conditions on health (Marmot et al., 2008; Shaw, 2004). Shaw (2004) provides a review of 
potential direct and indirect effects of housing on health looking at historical and current 
evidence. She points out that respiratory health is the main health outcome to be affected by 
temperature and humidity in the house. Palacios et al. (2020) have recently shown that living 
in a poorly-maintained dwelling is associated with poorer self-assessed health and more 
doctor visits, particularly amongst older people. As home owners are able to make structural 
adjustments to their dwellings, home ownership could improve housing quality and, therefore, 
health (Haurin et al., 2002; Chapman, 2013).  
 
Second, home ownership could also have a direct effect on health by providing people with a 
sense of physical and emotional security, control over their life and safety (Elsinga et al., 
2008). This might reflect social comparisons with those who did not make it onto the housing 
ladder or it might be related to home owners' ability to make changes to their houses. These 
non-financial effects may affect psychological health favourably.  
 
Third, home ownership could have an indirect effect on health through a housing wealth effect. 
Housing wealth represents 60% of British households' financial wealth (Banks et al., 2003). 
The U.K. housing market is one of the most volatile in the world (Ferrari and Rae, 2011). Equity 
extraction from unsold homes is quite large in the U.K., reaching 6-8% of total household 
income in the mid-2000s (Reinold, 2011). Such wealth gains have an ambiguous effect on 
health depending on the relative size of the substitution and wealth effects. Fichera and 
Gathergood (2016) find that house price gains improve physical health. They find no 
statistically significant effect of housing wealth gains on risky health behaviours such as 
smoking and drinking. But they find that housing wealth increases the likelihood of private 
medical coverage for home owners. However, this wealth effect could have detrimental effects 
on health inducing anxiety if home owners struggle to keep up with mortgage payments 
(Nettleton and Burrows, 2000; Evans et al., 2003).  
 
Another potential indirect effect of home ownership on health is via labour markets 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2013; Laamanen, 2017; Oswald, 1996). Blanchflower and Oswald 
(2013) find that the housing market can create dampening externalities on the labour market 
and the economy. Using historic state-level data in the United States, they show that states 
with higher rates of home ownership have longer commute times and higher levels of 
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joblessness. There is indeed evidence that longer commuting times reduce well-being, have 
detrimental effects on self-assessed health and reduce health-related quality of life (Munford 
et al., 2015). The effect found by Blanchflower and Oswald (2013) is quite large, as a doubling 
of the home ownership rate is associated with more than a doubling of the long-run 
unemployment rate. These results are confirmed by micro-level data on two million individuals 
from the March Current Population Surveys (1992-2011). Laamanen (2017) find similar results 
using Finnish individual level data exploiting a rental housing market deregulation reform in 
the early 1990s. However, when looking at the effect of house price gains in the U.K., Fichera 
and Gathergood (2016) find a reduction of working hours by women suggesting a substitution 
of working hours with the additional wealth.  
 
A final indirect effect of home ownership is via the production of social capital. Some studies 
find that home owners are more likely to belong to church and community organisations 
(Homenuck, 1973); they are involved in neighbourhood and block associations (Rohe and 
Stegman, 1994); they are more socially communicative with neighbours (Fischer, 1982) and 
politically active (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2000). This social activity effect could favourably 
impact psychological health. 
 
 
2.2 Effects of other exogenous variations in wealth on health 
 
Our paper also relates to a more general literature, the relationship between economic 
resources and health. One strand of this literature uses exogenous changes in economic 
resources exploiting lottery wins (Apouey and Clark, 2015; Lindahl, 2005; Gardner and 
Oswald, 2007), inheritance (Meer et al., 2003; Kim and Ruhm, 2012), cohort-level income 
shocks (Adda et al., 2009), weather shocks (Fichera and Savage, 2015), spousal wealth 
(Michaud and Van Soest, 2008) and recessions (Ruhm, 2000).  
 
Apouey and Clark (2015) use a sample of lottery winners from the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) between 1997 and 2005 and find that greater lottery winnings produce better 
mental health, but induce riskier lifestyle choices such as smoking and social drinking. Meer 
et al. (2003) use the 1984, 1989, 1994 and 1999 waves of the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics and an instrumental variable approach where inheritance is an instrument for 
wealth. They find that in the short-run there is no statistically significant evidence of the health-
wealth nexus. The seminal work of Ruhm (2000) suggests that unemployment rates and 
health are pro-cyclical, but later work (Ruhm, 2015) showed that this was true only after 
accounting for time periods, with different effects in the periods 1976-1995 compared to 1991-
2010. It has also been argued that the level of analysis (micro vs. macro) is important, but van 
den Berg et al. (2017) find consistent results when they use the same data at both levels.  
 
A second strand of this literature exploits changes in public policies as source of exogenous 
variation in income or wealth (Snyder and Evans, 2006; Frijters et al., 2005; Case, 2004; 
Schmeiser, 2009). For instance, Frijters et al. (2005) compare health satisfaction between 
East and West Germany using post-unification income changes. Using data from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel Survey between 1984 and 2002, they find positive effects of income 
changes on health satisfaction. Schmeiser (2009) exploits state-level differences in the 
Earned Income Tax Credit supplement to examine the impact of income on body mass index 
(BMI). Using the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 cohort and instrumental 
variable methods, he finds that an additional $1,000 of family income raises BMI by 0.07 units 
for men and by 0.24 units for women.  
 
Finally, our paper contributes to a growing number of studies that exploits the timing and 
spatial variations of a policy (Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2009; Ludwig and Miller, 2007; 
Cascio et al., 2010; Fichera and von Hinke, 2020). For instance, Fichera and von Hinke (2020) 
use the variation in the introduction of food labelling across British supermarkets to examine 
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its impact on household dietary choices. In our paper we exploit the timing and variation in the 
intensity of the discount across geographical areas in England. 
 
 
3. The Right to Buy Policy 
The Right to Buy policy gives long-term tenants of publicly-owned properties the legal right to 
buy their residence at a large discount. The rationale was to give households a tangible asset, 
secure their finances and improve public finances as well.  
 
Eligibility for the scheme depends on the length of time that individuals have rented their 
property. No discounts are available if the property is rented privately. The size of discount 
available is related to the property value, the property type and the length of tenancy, and is 
subject to a maximum cap.  
 
Over the period that we study, eligibility required at least two years of tenancy. For houses, 
the possible discount was calculated as 32% of the property value, plus 1% for each year of 
tenancy over two years. For flats, the possible discount was 44% of the property value plus 
2% for each year of tenancy over two years.  
 
Between February 1999 and February 2003, the maximum discount was capped at £38,000 
in most areas, though this cap varied geographically and was as low as £22,000 in some 
areas. In March 2003, the discounts were reduced to reflect pressure on available public 
housing in some areas. In nine Local Authorities (LAs) in the South East, and all but two 
London boroughs, the maximum discount was reduced to £16,000 (see Figure 1, Panel (i)).  
 
To illustrate how the scheme works, consider two identical individuals, A and B, living in 
houses valued at £100,000 in 2001. Both have been public renters in their respective homes 
for 7 years. Without caps, they would both be entitled to a Right to Buy discount of 
0.32*(£100,000)+0.01*(7-2)*(£100,000) = £37,000. Individual A lives in the south east and so 
can have the full £37,000 discount, as this is just below the cap of £38,000. However, as 
individual B lives in the north-east, their discount is capped at £22,000.  
 
In Panel (ii) of Figure 1 we show that the local authority homeownership rates are higher in 
areas where the discount were higher (correlation = 0.05). This is particularly true within the 
East of England and the South East regions. However, when the discounts were reduced in 
2003, the correlation with ownership rates fell as well (correlation = 0.03). 
 
The size of the maximum discount in each local authority was set nationally by central 
government. There is evidence of geographical clustering of the cap (see Figure 1 panel (i)), 
as they were set according to average property values and measures of economic prosperity. 
To check whether these caps were functions of health in the local area, we regressed the caps 
on measures of population health, economic indicators and year dummies. The health 
measures (contemporaneous or lagged) were not significant predictors of the discount in any 
specification (Table A2, Appendix A). We therefore treat these maximum discount caps as 
conditionally exogenous to health. 
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Figure 1: Map of geographic variation in subsidies and ownership rates in England 
Panel (i): Right to Buy maximum discount caps by local authorities 
 
Panel (ii): Average annual ownership rates by local authorities 
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Panel (iii): Average General health Questionnaire (GHQ) scores by local authorities 
 
 
Source: Authors' representation. Data for the two graphs in panel (i) has been obtained from the Department of 
Communities and Local Government. The two graphs in panel (ii) use BHPS data 1999-2008, to show the local 
authority average of the ownership variable. As this variable is binary, we multiply by 100 to obtain percentages. 
The two graphs in panel (iii) use BHPS data 1999-2008, to show the local authority average of the GHQ variable. 
This variable is increasing in health, with 36 the highest possible response.  
 
 
 
 
 
4. Datasets 
4.1 Local Authority Data 
We start by considering the Local Authority District (LAD) as the unit of analysis. These 326 
areas are administrative geographies that usually encompass one city or a larger rural area.  
 
We use annual data from 2000 to 2010 on home ownership, including: (i) the proportion of 
individuals who own their home (either outright or through a mortgage); (ii) the number of 
recorded Right to Buy sales; and (iii) the maximum available Right to Buy discount cap.  
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We also obtain two measures of population health: (i) the proportion of individuals who report 
having a longstanding health condition; and (ii) the average number of health conditions 
reported on a pre-specified list.  
 
We add other characteristics which could correlate with health, including: (i) the proportion of 
people who are economically active; (ii) median hours worked per-week; (iii) median weekly 
pay; (iv) population size; and (v) the proportion of the population aged 65 years and older.  
 
Further information on these variables, and their sources, are reported in Table A1. 
 
4.2 Individual level data: The British Household Panel Survey 
At the individual level, we use data from waves 10 to 18 (2000-2008) of the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS). We did not use the follow-up years in Understanding Society (the UK 
Household Longitudinal Study) because the Great Recession, characterised by a subprime 
mortgage crisis, had a differential effect across the UK potentially confounding our analysis. 
The BHPS is a nationally-representative, annual, longitudinal survey of households in the UK. 
Each member (aged 16+) of the household is asked a series of questions on a wide range of 
topics. Information is also collected at the household level (including household size and 
composition, council tax band.1  
 
One advantage of the BHPS is that it asks respondents about a broad range of health 
conditions and contains detailed information on housing, geographic location and a broad 
range of socio-economic characteristics, such as income and labour market status.  It also 
has the attraction of being a panel survey which employs a ‘following rule’, so that it remains 
representative of the UK population throughout the 18 waves. In the following subsections we 
outline some of the more relevant variables we consider. Additional detail on further variables 
considered is included in Appendix A.2. 
 
We use a special license version of the data containing the LAD location of each household. 
Using this information, we match in data on house price sales. We use the LAD-level house 
price index provided by Halifax Bank of Scotland (Fichera and Gathergood (2016) for details). 
 
4.2.1 Health and well-being outcomes 
We use self-assessed health (SAH) as a measure of subjective health (Contoyannis et al., 
2004). Individuals are asked “Please think back over the last 12 months about how your health 
has been. Compared to people of your own age, would you say that your health has on the 
whole been ...”, and are given options (1) ‘Excellent’ through to (5) ‘Very Poor’. For ease of 
interpretation, we recode SAH such that higher scores correspond to better health. 
We use the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) to measure subjective well-being. The GHQ 
contains 12 questions designed to identify minor psychiatric disorders and measure 
psychosocial health and has been widely used as a proxy for well-being (Clark and Oswald, 
1994; Clark, 2003; Roberts et al., 2011). Each of the 12 questions is answered on a 0-3 scale, 
thus giving a 37-point summary scale. As with SAH, we reverse code this, so that higher 
responses correspond to higher levels of health.   
We use the count of the number of reported health conditions as a more objective measure of 
health. We focus on the 13 conditions that were consistently presented to respondents 
                                                          
1 Council tax, introduced in 1993, is a tax on domestic properties in England. Every property is placed 
into one of eight bands, depending on the assumed capital value of the property as of 1st April, 1991. 
Properties constructed after 1991 are assigned a nominal assumed capital value, based on 1991 
prices. 
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throughout the survey period. In additional analyses, we investigate each of these conditions 
separately by generating five dummy variables for the following categories: (a) 
musculoskeletal problems, comprising arthritic/rheumatic conditions; (b) cardiovascular 
diseases (CVD), comprising diabetes and heart/blood pressure problems; (c) skin, allergy, 
hearing and sight problems; (d) respiratory problems, comprising bronchial and asthmatic 
conditions; and (e) other chronic problems, comprising cancer, stroke and epilepsy.  
We measure health-seeking behaviours with five variables: (a) possession of supplementary 
private health insurance, (b) number of General Practitioner visits, (c) current smoking status, 
(d) number of cigarettes smoked per day, and (e) whether physically active. In the BHPS 
individuals are asked how many times they visited the doctor in the last 12 months with the 
possible answers being: none; one or two times; three to five times; six to ten times; and more 
than ten times. We recode this variable to the midpoint value of each interval of reported 
number of visits. Active is a dummy variable that equals one if in the past 12 months the BHPS 
has been gardening or she had done yoga or sport several times a year or more. 
 
4.2.2 Housing tenure, housing characteristics, and eligibility for Right 
to Buy 
The BHPS asks people to report their housing tenure from a seven-point list. We use this 
information to classify people into three groups: (1) owners (including outright and with a 
mortgage); (2) public renters; and (3) private renters.  
If a house is owned, the owner is asked to report the value of their property and the band 
within which it falls for the payment of local council tax. We generate dummy variables for 
each of the eight council tax bands: “A” ≤£40,000, “B” >£40,000 and ≤£52,000, “C” >£52,000 
and ≤£68,000, “D” >£68,000 and ≤£88,000, “E” >£88,000 and ≤£120,000, “F” >£120,000 and 
≤£160,000, “G” >£160,000 and ≤£320,000, and “H” >£320,000. Non-owners are not asked to 
report the value of the property, but are asked to report the council tax band, as this is payable 
regardless of tenure type.  
As well as recording the date of the interview, the BHPS asks individuals what date they moved 
into their current house. From these two pieces of information, we can calculate how long an 
individual has lived at their current address. We use this information to establish which public 
renters are eligible for the Right to Buy discount, and the size of discount they are eligible for. 
Characteristics of the house are reported, including number of rooms, property type (detached, 
semi-detached, terrace, end-terrace purpose built flat, converted flat, contains business 
premises, and other), whether there is central heating (and if so, what fuel), whether there is 
a garden or terrace (“Does this accommodation have the following facilities? A place to seat 
outside e.g. a terrace or garden?”), if there is a separate kitchen, and if there is a separate 
toilet. Individuals are also asked to report if there is a problem with pollution and 
crime/vandalism in their local area. 
4.2.3 Estimation sample at the individual level  
As we are interested in the transition from renting to owning, our estimation sample is 
comprised of people who were public renters when we first observe them in the data. We only 
include individuals with more than one observation. Our estimation sample contains 1,204 
individuals and 6,430 observations, around 12% of the whole BHPS sample. 
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5 Empirical Strategy  
 
5.1 Area-level analysis 
Our starting point is an area-level analysis. The basic model is: 
𝐻𝑙𝑡 = α1𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑡 + α2Xlt + μ𝑙 + ut + εlt 
 
(1) 
where H is a measure of health for area l at time t, owner is the home ownership rate, X is a 
vector of time varying characteristics (see Table A1),  𝜇 is a LAD fixed-effect, u is a time fixed-
effect, and 𝜀 is an error term.  
However, the above simple specification ignores possible reverse causality between health 
and home ownership. To overcome this, we implement a fixed-effects instrumental variable 
(FE-IV) specification, where the first stage is specified as: 
ownerlt = π1𝑅𝑡𝐵𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝 + π2Xlt + μl
1 + ut
1 + εlt
1  
 
(2) 
where the first-stage instrument, RtBDiscountCap, is the maximum discount. The identifying 
assumption is that the RtB discount should only affect health through its effect in encouraging 
home ownership. 
 
5.2 Individual-level analysis  
At the individual level, we exploit the longitudinal nature of the dataset and control for a wide 
range of factors that might affect both home ownership and health: 
𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑡 = β1ownerilt + β2Xilt + β3HCilt + μ(l×t) + εilt 
 
(3) 
where subscript i indicates the individual, l is the region where i lives, and t is year. H is a 
measure of health or well-being, owner is a binary variable equal to one if an individual owns 
the house they live in. The vector X contains socioeconomic and demographic information 
known to correlate with health and well-being (Appendix A.2). HC contains selected house 
characteristics that might have a direct effect on health (central heating fuel type, if there is a 
garden, if there are issues with pollution or if there are issues with crime/vandalism). 𝜇(𝑙×𝑡) is 
the interaction of region and time fixed effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑙𝑡 is a stochastic error term.  
The coefficient 𝛽1 is our main coefficient of interest indicating the relationship between home 
ownership and health. By exploiting the longitudinal nature of our data, we estimate within 
region changes in health rather than health differences between regions. As we cannot control 
for all the geographic factors that correlate both with home ownership and health, we follow 
Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) and include region-by-time fixed effects. These allow us to 
control for factors such as the quality of healthcare or of schooling which might change over 
time and affect health and the propensity to become a home owner. 
However, 𝛽1 is still likely to be biased as unobserved factors that affect health also affect home 
ownership. For instance, individuals’ time preferences influence how individuals make 
intertemporal choices such as investing in a house, becoming a home owner and investing in 
prevention to increase life expectancy.  
To overcome these issues, we modify Eq. (3) as follows: 
𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑙𝑡 + β4φ̂ilt + 𝜇(𝑙×𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑙𝑡 
 
(4) 
11 
 
 
where the predicted residual (?̂?𝑖𝑙𝑡) is obtained from the following hedonic regression: 
𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑡 = γ1RtBDiscountilt + γ2Cilt + γ3𝑋𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑡 
 
(5) 
 
The probability of becoming a home owner is explained by the potential Right to Buy discount 
that this individual could receive if they bought the property they currently publicly rent. As 
stated above, this discount varies by individual (and house), by LAD, and over time. We 
describe the hedonic regressions associated with this discount in the next subsection. The 
vector C contains other factors that could influence the choice to buy a house, including the 
duration at the current property and the average local area house price.  
The identifying assumption is that, after controlling for a range of individual and house 
characteristics, as well as time invariant and time varying local authority factors, home 
ownership is conditionally exogenous to health. Under this assumption, 𝛽1 in Eq. (4) measures 
the effect of home ownership on health through changes in the value of the discount they 
would be entitled to (Terza et al., 2008). 
Note that equation (5) is a pooled regression and we do not use individual level fixed-effects. 
This is because there were too few individuals whose ownership status changed. However, 
given the estimation sample comprises of people who were initially public renters, any change 
in the ‘owner’ dummy is from an initial position of renting – i.e. owner=1 implies a person is 
now (in period t) an owner, given they were previously a renter. 
 
5.2.1 Calculating the size of the potential Right to Buy discount  
As the Right to Buy discount varies across both time and place, we first calculate the potential 
discount renters could be entitled to. To do this, we use several hedonic regressions. 
Step 1: Calculate the estimated value of a rented property 
Property values are only reported by owners. We therefore need to estimate property values 
for renters. We regress the house prices (HP) reported by owners on house characteristics 
(HC*) and the local house prices (from the land registry; 𝐻𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ).  
𝐻𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑡 = δ1HCilt
∗ + δ2𝐻𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡 
 
(6) 
where 𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡  is a stochastic error term. The elements of the vector HC
* include: the number of 
rooms interacted with the house type, the council tax band, the central heating fuel type, if 
there is a separate toilet/bathroom, if the kitchen is open-plan, if there is a garden/terrace, if 
there is an indoor toilet, and if there are neighbourhood problems with either crime/vandalism 
and/or pollution/the environment. We do not include time or local authority fixed-effects, as 
this variation should be captured in the local house price (𝐻𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝑙𝑡).  
We then apply the estimated coefficients (δ1̂, δ2̂) to the same house characteristics of renters, 
to obtain an imputed value of a rented property, (HP̂). 
 
 
Step 2: Calculate the potential Right to Buy discount 
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Once we have the estimated value of a rented property (HP̂), we can use this to calculate the 
potential Right to Buy discount that this individual could receive if they bought this property. 
These discounts are:   
RtBDiscountilt  =  {
𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑀𝑙𝑡, ((0.32 + 0.01(max(𝑇𝑖𝑙𝑡 − 2) , 0))𝐻𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑡̂ }
𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑀𝑙𝑡, ((0.44 + 0.02(max (𝑇𝑖𝑙𝑡 − 2), 0))𝐻𝑃𝑖𝑙?̂?}
      
𝑖𝑓 𝑎 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒
𝑖𝑓 𝑎 𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡      
 
(7) 
 
Where M is the maximum discount cap in local authority l at time t, and T is the length of time 
that the individual has lived in the current property.  
 
5.3 Robustness checks 
To mitigate concerns about other within-area factors that may affect health, we estimate Eq. 
(4) for private renters, a “placebo” group that we expect not to be affected by the Right to Buy. 
We use propensity score matching with caliper and no replacement to construct a sample of 
private renters similar to public renters in terms of age, marital status, education, income and 
household size, house characteristics and region and time interactions.  
A second potential source of concern relates to the measurement error of house 
characteristics being related to health. Therefore, we regress reported house price on average 
local house prices (Eq. (6)) excluding the house characteristics.  
In a third robustness check we exclude income as it may be a “bad control” (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2008). 
Fourth, we investigate the health effects of home ownership separately for heads and non-
heads of household.  
Fifth, one might argue that the Right to Buy scheme was more appealing to people who are in 
employment as opposed to those who are not. We re-estimate equation Eq. (4) on those who 
were employed the first time they were observed in the survey. 
Sixth, to account for the potential ordinal nature of SAH we apply an ordered logit model in the 
second stage. 
Finally, we perform other robustness checks by removing outliers such as Manchester and 
Birmingham, West Devon and South Buckinghamshire from our macro-level analyses. We 
also check the robustness of our results to leads and lags, as we do not know if there were 
anticipation effects, nor do we know if our results are due to increasing health of new owners 
or deteriorating health of non-owners.  
 
6 Results  
 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics for the area level dataset are provided in Table 1, panel (a). The average 
ownership rate is just over 70% and the average number of self-reported conditions is 0.58. 
Just under 30% of people report having a longstanding health condition.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics from the LAD and individual-level data 
 Estimation Sample Full Sample 
Panel (a): LAD-level Mean S.D. Min. Max.  
Rate of people with a longstanding health 
condition 
0.28 0.05 0.00 0.58  
Average number of self-reported health 
conditions 
0.58 0.18 0.00 2.16  
Home ownership rate 0.71 0.12 0.08 0.96  
RtB discount cap 32,967 7,026 16,000 38,000  
Prop. of population aged 65+ years 0.17 0.04 0.06 0.30  
Median weekly pay (deflated) 388.29 73.23 222.50 884.04  
Median weekly hours worked 39.60 0.81 29.4 40  
Economic activity rate (aged 16-64) 0.78 0.05 0.59 0.93  
Prop. of population with no qualifications 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.32  
Crimes per 1,000 population 92.55 4.61 42.35 1377.0  
LADs (N) 
Observations (N*T) 
311 
2161 
 
Panel (b): Individual-level Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean (S.D.) 
Health and well-being 
   
 
 
Self-assessed health *SAH) 3.45 1.02 1 5 3.81 (0.92) 
GHQ 23.74 6.04 0 36 24.82 (5.38) 
Number of Health Conditions 1.69 1.59 0 9 1.18 (1.32) 
Individual characteristics 
   
 
 
Male 0.42 
 
0 1 0.47 
Age 50.45 19.93 16 99 47.41 (18.27) 
Age squared 2942.1 2145.52 256 9801 2581.73 (1880.20) 
Married 0.42 
 
0 1 0.57 
School qualifications 0.33 
 
0 1 0.32 
College qualifications 0.10 
 
0 1 0.19 
University qualifications 0.05 
 
0 1 0.22 
House characteristics 
   
 
 
Equivalised log household income 6.8 0.47 1.58 9.76 7.11 (0.62) 
Number of people in household 2.68 1.5 1 8 2.69 (1.30) 
Estimated House Price (£'000s) 120.05 78.5 0.23 717.1 N/A 
Calculated RtB discount (£'000s) 24.25 9.89 0 38 N/A 
LAD average house prices (£'000s) 142.98 73.51 43.27 823.18 N/A 
Transition to ownership 
   
 
 
Becomes a home owner 0.17 0.35 0 1 N/A 
    
Panel (c): Mechanisms Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean (S.D.) 
Private Health Insurance  0.02  0 1 0.06 
Number of visits to the doctor in last year 3.82 3.52 0 10 2.93 (3.06) 
Number of cigarettes smoked per day 16.16 8.99 0 80 14.30 (8.39) 
Current smoker 0.43  0 1 0.24 
Active 0.36  0 1 0.37 
Employed 0.43  0 1 0.62 
Working time (hours per week) 33.78 12.74 1 97 34.64 (12.23) 
Commuting time 20.57 18.55 1 240 24.86 (22.02) 
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Expenditure on leisure (£ per week) 28.39 36.72 0 160 41.30 (43.18) 
Housing costs (net monthly £) 188.89 184.69 0 1,716 266.97 (315.98) 
Garden 0.91  0 1 0.94 
Number of rooms 3.67 1.20 1 10 3.66 
Type of accommodation: detached    0.02  0 1 0.02 
Type of accommodation: Semi-detached    0.33  0 1 0.33 
Type of accommodation: End-Terrace    0.11  0 1 0.12 
Type of accommodation: Terrace    0.29  0 1 0.28 
Type of accommodation: Purpose built flat    0.22  0 1 0.22 
Type of accommodation: Converted flat    0.03  0 1 0.03 
Council Tax band: A 0.51  0 1 0.53 
Council Tax band: B 0.24  0 1 0.23 
Council Tax band: C 0.13  0 1 0.13 
Council Tax band: D 0.8  0 1 0.08 
Council Tax band: E 0.02  0 1 0.02 
Council Tax band: F 0.01  0 1 0.01 
Council Tax band: G 0.002  0 1 0.002 
Council Tax band: H 0.001  0 1 0.001 
Central heating type: gas 0.84  0 1 0.84 
Central heating type: electricity 0.12  0 1 0.12 
Central heating type: solid fuel 0.02  0 1 0.02 
Central heating type: oil 0.01  0 1 0.01 
Central heating type: other 0.06  0 1 0.001 
Own bathroom 0.98  0 1 0.98 
Separate kitchen 0.99  0 1 0.99 
Individual toilet 0.99  0 1 0.99 
Pollution in area 0.08  0 1 0.07 
Vandalism in area 0.27  0 1 0.16 
Vote 0.35  0 1 0.39 
Talk to neighbours 0.81  0 1 0.78 
Satisfaction with home 5.13 1.62 1 7 5.40 (1.38) 
Individuals (N) 1,204 20,294 
Observations (N*T) 6,430 56,607 
These values are based on the original sample(s), and not on the bootstrapped data. In panel (b), for the full sample, we report mean 
and standard deviation values only for reasons of space. In Panel (c) the sample size for each variable is the same as the estimation 
samples in Table 6 which we do not report for reasons of space. The full sample for the mechanisms is lower than the one reported 
for the labour market variables referring to those in work (NT=34,700), and for the cigarettes smoked by smokers (NT=12,986). 
 
 
Of the 1,204 individuals in our micro-level sample, 207 (17%) go on to become home owners 
(Table 1, panel (b)). Of the 207 people who become owners, only 25 (12%) then go back to 
renting at some point in the future.  
The average calculated house value in our sample is just over £120,000 and the predicted 
Right to Buy discount is £24,250. Rosen and Rosen (1980) modelled owned and rented 
houses as two distinct commodities, with different characteristics (i.e. size, outside space etc.). 
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We compare house characteristics in our sample to the full BHPS sample. On average we do 
not find large differences in the number of rooms, type of central heating, council tax, although 
94% of houses in the BHPS have a garden against 91% in our sample. 
In Panel (c) of Table 1 we report selected descriptive statistics of the potential mechanisms. 
The proportion of people paying for supplementary private insurance is very low. On average, 
respondents go to the doctor about three times a year. Approximately 43% are smokers and 
the smokers smoke an average of 16 cigarettes per day. About 43% of our estimation sample 
are employed, work about 34 hours a week and spend about 20 minutes per day travelling to 
work. Compared to the full BHPS sample, the sample of initial public renters were less likely 
to have a garden, more likely to live in polluted areas and in areas with vandalism problems. 
In Appendix C we examine the quality of our house price predictions by considering several 
assumptions and distributional properties. 
 
Table 2: Local Authority District level fixed-effects instrumental variables analysis of home 
ownership on health 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 (First stage) (Second stage) (Second stage) 
  
LAD  
ownership rate 
Rate of  
people with LHC 
Average no.  
of health probs. 
    
LAD ownership rates   -0.198*** -0.493*** 
(instrumented)  (0.053) (0.0151) 
    
Max. RtB discount (£'000s)  0.0024***   
(instrument) (0.000)   
    
% of population aged 65+ -0.0124*** 0.00931*** 0.0181*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
    
Median weekly pay (deflated) 0.00000146 -0.000025 -0.000014 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Median hours worked per week 0.00308 -0.00310* -0.00650 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
    
% of population economically active 0.00164*** -0.00185*** -0.00620*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
First-stage F-statistic  
Observations (N*T) 
17.02 
2161 2161 2161 
Sample includes initial public renters only, 2003 – 2010. We have information on N=311 LADs. Standard errors in 
parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. LHC=longstanding health condition (lasting at least 12 months). 
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6.2 Macro-level results 
Higher Right to Buy discounts are associated with higher levels of home ownership (column 
(1); Table 2). The first-stage F-statistic is 17.02 implying that at a LAD-level, the Right to Buy 
discount is a strong predictor of ownership rates and hence our instrument is relevant (Stock 
and Yogo, 2005; Stock et al., 2002).  
LADs with higher home ownership (instrumented by Right to Buy discounts) have lower rates 
of longstanding health conditions; a 10-percentage point increase in the home ownership rate 
reduces the rate of people with longstanding health conditions by about 2 percentage points. 
Similarly, higher home ownership is associated with lower numbers of health problems; a 10-
percentage point increase in the home ownership rate reduces the average number of health 
problems by around 0.5. 
 
6.3 Individual-level results 
 
6.3.1 First Stage Results: How Right to Buy discounts affect the 
probability of home ownership  
The Right to Buy discount is a statistically significant predictor of home ownership uptake; a 
£10,000 increase in the Right to Buy discount increases the probability of ownership by 2 
(=0.002*100*10) percentage points (Table A3 in Appendix A.3). The first-stage Likelihood-
Ratio (LR)-statistic is 1036.67, meaning that the Right to Buy discount is a very strong 
predictor of ownership and hence our instrument is relevant (Stock and Yogo, 2005; Stock et 
al., 2002).  
The longer an individual has lived in their publicly rented property, the less likely they are to 
buy it; every additional year in the property reduces the probability of ownership by 0.1 
percentage points. Also, people who live in areas with expensive average house prices, ceteris 
paribus, are less likely to buy; a 10% increase in average local property prices reduced the 
probability that an individual becomes an owner by 0.8 percentage points. 
 
6.3.2 Second Stage Results: How home ownership affects health and 
well-being   
 
We report the second stage results along with one stage model estimates in Table 3. 
Homeownership is associated with higher self-assessed health in both the one and two stage 
models. The significance of the first stage residual indicates it is necessary to account for 
endogeneity. Being an owner increases self-assessed health by 0.19 points on a five-point 
scale. 
When we consider GHQ as an outcome, we can see there is no effect of homeownership in a 
one-stage OLS model (column (3)). However, when we consider a two-stage model (column 
(4)), we see that the effect of predicted homeownership on GHQ is large in magnitude (β =
1.4) and statistically significant. As the endogeneity test (first stage residual) rejects the null 
hypothesis that home ownership is exogenous, we prefer the two-stage model results.  
Home ownership is associated with a reduction in the number of chronic conditions in both the 
one-stage and two-stage models. The reduction is larger in the two-stage model (0.65 
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compared to 0.44), and our preferred model is the two-stage model, due to the significance of 
the first stage residual. 
 
 
Table 3: Single-stage and second-stage models of physical and psychological health 
outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outcome: SAH GHQ #Probs 
Model: OLS 2SRI OLS OLS 2SRI OLS Nbreg 2SRI Nbreg 
       
Being a home owner 0.248*** 0.185* 0.455 1.458** -0.441*** -0.651*** 
 (0.048) (0.104) (0.287) (0.587) (0.088) (0.149) 
       
First Stage Residual   0.023***  -0.365**  0.074** 
  (0.003)  (0.151)  (0.035) 
       
Socioeconomic Characteristics a Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Housing Characteristics b Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Year x Region c Interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations (N*T) 6430 6430 6430 6430 6430 6430 
Sample includes initial social renters only, 2000 – 2008. Coefficients displayed Bootstrapped standard errors, based on 2,000 
replications, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
The estimates presented in columns (1) - (4) are coefficients. The estimates presented in columns (5) and (6) are marginal 
effects, calculated at the means of independent variables. 
a: additional controls include: sex, age, age squared, log of monthly household income, marital status, and educational 
attainment. 
b: housing characteristics included are: heating type, problems with vandalism or crime, problems with pollution, whether there is 
a garden.  
c: England is broken down into 16 regions. We include regions as opposed to lad dummies as using lower levels of geography 
encountered problems with collinearity.  
SAH=self-assessed health; GHQ=General Health Questionnaire; #Probs.=Number of self-reported health conditions. 
OLS=ordinary least squares; 2SRI = two-stage residual inclusion; Nbreg = negative binomial regression.  
 
In separate models, which we do not present here, we change the set of control variables in 
the models reported in Table 3. Separately, we additionally include more household 
characteristics that may change as a result of ownership (i.e. the number of rooms) and the 
number of children present in the household. The main results are qualitatively very similar 
and are available on request. We do not present them here as it could be argued that having 
children, for example, would be endogenous to either home ownership decisions or health, or 
even both.  
 
 
 
6.4 Robustness checks  
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The relationships between ownership and health and well-being outcomes for private renters 
are not statistically significant. The coefficients maintain the expected direction but are much 
smaller than for public renters.  
The results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar when we remove the outlier values 
of Manchester, Birmingham, West Devon and South Buckinghamshire from the macro-level 
analysis (results available on request). 
 
 
Table 4: Second-stage models of physical and psychological health outcomes for first 
robustness check (placebo policy of private renters) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Outcome: SAH GHQ #Probs 
Model:  2SRI OLS 2SRI OLS 2SRI Nbreg 
    
Being a home owner 0.099 0.458 -0.277 
 (0.125) (0.458) (0.173) 
    
First stage residual  -0.003 -0.079 -0.033 
 (0.044) (0.263) (0.059) 
        
Sample includes initial private renters only, 2000 - 2008. Initial private renters are matched to similar initial public renters 
using propensity score matching. We have information on N=545 individuals. Bootstrapped standard errors, based on 
2,000 replications in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Marginal effects, from second stage models, 
calculated at the means of independent variables. The models contain all additional variables as reported in Table 3. 
 
 
To descriptively examine the potential for lead and lag effects at the individual level, we plot 
the average health status of those who do go on to become a home owner against years to 
and from becoming an owner in Figure 2. For graphical clarity, we normalise all health 
measures to one at the year ownership occurs.  We focus on four years prior to and six years 
post ownership, to ensure all cells contain at least 35 observations. 
There are no anticipation effects. In the four years leading up to ownership all three health 
measures appear constant. However, after becoming an owner there are marked 
improvements in all three health measures. GHQ and SAH increase and there is a reduction 
in the number of health problems reported. This suggests that there are improvements in the 
health of owners rather than deteriorations in health of those who continue to rent.  
The results from the remaining robustness checks are available in Appendix B. They show 
that the findings are robust. 
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Figure 2: Average health for those who become an owner by years to/from ownership 
 
Source: Authors' representation from BHPS data 1999-2008. 
 
 
 
6.5 Selection into home ownership 
If healthier initial renters are more or less likely to go onto purchase the homes they live in, we 
could have issues with identification brought about through a ‘selection effect’. In order to 
investigate if there is a selection effect into home ownership, we regress a binary indicator of 
whether an individual will become a home owner against baseline health (reported the first 
time an individual is observed in the data) as well as other possible confounding variables (as 
reported in notes a and c of Table 3). We observe that initial health has no statistically 
significant effect on predicting future home ownership (Table B4). We would like to 
acknowledge an anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
 
7. Mechanisms  
Investigating the mechanisms through which home ownership affects health is important for 
the design of policies that can influence these pathways. In the BHPS there is limited 
availability of specific inputs of the health production function. For instance, we have no 
information on food expenditure, or the time spent on leisure activities. Nevertheless, using 
the limited data available we explore some potential mechanisms. 
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First, we follow Apouey and Clark (2015) and examine the effect of home ownership on 
different components of health. The purpose of this exercise is twofold. Firstly, the temporal 
dimension of health and its measurement (Mullahy, 2016) has implications as to whether 
housing policies could have long-lasting or shortly-lived health effects. In the Grossman (1972) 
human capital model there is a distinction between health capital (i.e. a stock measure of 
health) and health status (i.e. “healthy time” or flow measure of health). For instance, in the 
BHPS the self-assessed health variable is anchored to a time dimension asking respondents 
to rate their health in the past 12 months. As such, it can be considered a flow measure. 
Instead, specific categories of health are not attached to any time dimensions and are 
therefore measures of the stock of health2. Secondly, the type of condition might inform us of 
the potential pathways between home ownership and health. For instance, if diabetes3 is 
affected by home ownership, we might expect potential pathways to be through lifestyle 
behaviours as being overweight, unhealthy diet and physical inactivity are three of the major 
risk factors for type 2 diabetes (World Health Organization, 2016). Therefore, we modify 
equation (4) where H indicates each of the six dummies of health conditions. We find that 
home ownership is associated with a 14-percentage point lower probability of reporting 
cardiovascular conditions (Table 5).  
 
Second, we directly observe some of the inputs of the health production function such as risky 
health behaviours, number of visits to the doctor and the purchase of private medical 
insurance. We expect home ownership to have an ambiguous effect on these. On the one 
hand, there is a wealth effect, meaning those who become home owners might be able to 
extract equity from their house and spend it on goods such as alcohol or cigarettes. If these 
are normal goods, home ownership might have detrimental effects on health. However, the 
wealth effect might allow individuals to purchase private medical care and have quicker access 
to treatment thereby improving health. On the other hand, there might be a time effect. 
Individuals might reduce their working hours by substituting wages for the equity extracted 
from the house. This extra time might be spent on preventive activities or on leisure activities 
(healthy or unhealthy). The extent to which individuals invest in healthier lifestyle behaviours 
might depend on their time preferences. Home ownership might change the intertemporal 
trade-off between current and future outcomes shifting individual preferences towards the 
future when the house can be fully owned or more equity can be extracted. In this case, 
individuals have more incentive to invest in their health. Or else more forward-looking 
individuals become home owners and invest more in their health. We explore these factors by 
modifying equation (4) and estimating a series of models of private health insurance, the 
probability to become a smoker and being active, and linear models for the number of visits to 
the doctor and number of cigarettes smoked by smokers. We find that those who become 
home owners are 11 percentage points less likely to smoke (column 4b). This result might 
also explain the changes in lifestyle-related conditions such as CVD. With regards to health-
seeking behaviours (panel (b) of Table 5), those who become home owners are four 
percentage points more likely to buy private health insurance and go to the doctor about two 
times fewer per year than renters.  
A third channel, Disney and Luo (2017) suggest that although the Right to Buy increased home 
ownership, this came at the expense of housing quality. The supply of accommodations 
eligible for the Right to Buy, although cheaper, tended to be of poor quality. There is evidence 
of a detrimental effect of poor house quality on health (Shaw, 2004; Marmot et al., 2008). We 
do not have detailed information on the quality of the house in the BHPS. However, we have 
                                                          
2 Although we can expect chronic conditions to be less transitory than conditions such as back problems, we have 
no information on the time-span they occur in. 
3 However, we note that we do not have information on the type of reported diabetes. 
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some information on the characteristics of the house that might directly impact on health. We 
modify equation (4) to separately estimate four models where the dependent variable is equal 
to one if the house where individual i lives has central heating, if it has garden, if there are 
issues with pollution or if there are issues with crime/vandalism. Note that because an 
individual who becomes an owner as a result of the Right to Buy scheme cannot move, we 
infer that they have redeveloped some land to create a garden (changing a yard to a garden, 
say) and their perceptions of their local area have changed, rather than actual observable 
changes to their local area. One individual becoming a home owner is unlikely to reduce area 
level pollution, say, but could impact on that individual's perceptions. We find that those who 
become home owners are 13 percentage points less likely to report respiratory problems and 
seven percentage points more likely to have a garden. As noted above, as household location 
is fixed for people who bought under the policy, this suggests that people redeveloped existing 
land into a usable garden space. We explore the possibility of excluding potential movers in 
Appendix B to further strengthen this claim. We do not find evidence of changes in pollution 
or vandalism as a result of an increase in home ownership. 
 
A fourth potential channel is via labour market activities. We investigate whether home 
ownership is positively associated with the likelihood of becoming employed and whether 
employed people change their working hours in response to the policy. We do so, by using a 
two-part model for equation (4). First, we use a logit model where the dependent variable 
indicates whether individual i is employed. Then we use a linear model where the dependent 
variable is working time measured with hours per week (if individual i is employed). These 
labour market consequences of the policy might have ambiguous effects on health depending 
on the relative size of the substitution and income effects. We find that those who become 
home owners are 11 percentage points more likely to be employed.  
 
A fifth channel is via non-market time activities and economic resources. If home ownership 
and commuting times are negatively related, then individuals might spend this extra time in 
the production of health. However, it is worth noting here that individuals who exploit the Right 
to Buy policy by definition cannot move their home location. Therefore, any change to 
commuting distance must be brought about by changes in workplace location, travel mode, or 
transport infrastructure (Munford et al., 2015). We estimate equation (4) with a linear model of 
commuting time (for those in employment). There is also a wealth effect as home owners can 
extract equity from their house or have more resources if their mortgage is lower than their 
rent, or if they were able to buy outright and are now rent-free. These extra resources could 
be used on leisure activities which we capture by estimating equation (4) with a linear model 
on expenditure on leisure activities measured in pound sterling per month. The BHPS records 
information on housing costs either in the form of monthly rental or mortgage payments. We 
modify equation (4) to be a linear model of housing costs. Although we find no evidence of a 
reduction in working time (Fichera and Gathergood, 2016), we find they spend about 5 minutes 
less travelling to work than renters. Our results suggest that they spend the extra resources 
(from working or saving on rent) and, to some extent, the extra time available to spend about 
six extra pounds on leisure activities. When we consider total monthly household costs, we 
find that those who own their home spend approximately £200 more a month on their home 
that those who rent. 
 
Finally, the social capital channel may operate via increased political participation, the building 
of social ties with neighbours and increased satisfaction with the home which home owners 
can improve (Fischer, 1982; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2000). Therefore, we estimate equation 
(4) with linear models of voting behaviour, of a variable indicating whether the BHPS 
respondent talks to their neighbours, and their satisfaction with their home. Our results suggest 
that owners are less likely to talk to their neighbours and are much more satisfied with their 
home than renters. This might be related to the time effects we find, where there is no change 
in working hours but an increase in expenditure on leisure activities which may impact on the 
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time spent talking to neighbours. There is no difference in voting behaviour between renters 
and owners. 
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Table 5: Second-stage models of mechanisms 
Panel (a): Specific health conditions 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) 
  
Musculoskeletal CVD Skin problems Respiratory problems Depression 
Other 
chronic 
Being a home owner 0.0311 -0.1365*** -0.1485*** -0.1289*** -0.0166 -0.0357 
 (0.0526) (0.0393) (0.0391) (0.0362) (0.0327) (0.0335) 
First stage residual  -0.0421** 0.0072 0.0315*** 0.0187* -0.0017 0.006 
 (0.0175) (0.0111) (0.0615) (0.0109) (0.0103) (0.0101) 
Observations (N*T) 6,430 6,430 6,430 6,430 6,430 6,430 
       
Panel (b): Health seeking behaviours 
 
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) 
 
 Private health No. visits to the No. cigarettes Smoker Active  
  insurance doctor         
       
Being a home owner 0.0414** -1.6989*** -0.4391 -0.1075** 0.0622 
 
 (0.0194) (0.2872) (1.2602) (0.0466) (0.0625)  
First stage residual  -0.0011 0.2078 0.2377 0.0105 -0.0109 
 
 (0.0067) (0.0922) (0.4235) (0.0155) (0.0188)  
Observations (N*T) 3,903 6,419 2,751 6,430 2,954   
       
Panel (c): Labour market and economic resources   
 (1c) (2c) (3c) (4c) (5c) 
 
  Employed Working time 
Commuting 
time 
Expenditure on 
leisure 
Housing 
costs   
Being a home owner 0.1114** -2.5493 -5.4086* 6.5273** 200.846*** 
 
 (0.0535) (1.5348) (2.6990) (2.7736) (12.7978)  
First stage residual  0.0484*** 1.5743*** 1.7619* 1.2641 -24.4117** 
 
 (0.0162) (0.5582) (1.7619) (0.8905) (4.1067) 
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Observations (N*T) 6,414 2,707 2,511 6,401 6,404   
 
    
 
 
Panel (d): Housing quality 
 
(1d) (2d) (3d) (4d) 
  
  Gas/electricity Garden Pollution Vandalism     
Being a home owner -0.0254 0.0632** -0.086 0.0249   
 (0.0254) (0.0335) (0.0327) (0.0397) 
 
 
First stage residual  -0.0004 0.0034 0.0024 -0.0196   
  (0.0079) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0132)     
Observations (N*T) 6,424 5,834 5,879 6,424     
       
Panel (e): Social capital  
 
(1e) (2e) (3e) 
   
 Vote 
Talk to 
neighbours 
Satisfaction 
with  
  
 
      home       
      
 
Being a home owner -0.0024 -0.7482*** 0.3808**    
 (0.0382) (0.2461) (0.1311)    
First stage residual -0.0012 0.1157 0.0009    
 (0.0123) (0.0861) (0.0428)    
Observations (N*T) 6,426 6,399 5,564       
Each panel contains a separate second stage model. Sample includes initial public renters only, 2000 – 2008.  
Bootstrapped standard errors, based on 2,000 replications, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 Marginal effects, from second stage models, calculated at the means of independent variables. The models contain all additional variables as reported in 
Table 3. 
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8. Discussion  
We find that the Right to Buy scheme led to increased levels of home ownership, and that that 
this home ownership is associated with better levels of health, both at the macro (area) and 
micro (individual) level. The results are consistent across both subjective and more objective 
measures of health and robust to several additional checks including falsification tests and 
exclusion of potential outliers. The Right to Buy policy has previously been shown to be a 
success in that it encourages individuals to buy their home. To our knowledge, this is the first 
study that quantifies the effect it had on health and well-being.  
The magnitude of the estimated effects is reasonable as previous studies have found that 
unemployment reduces self-assessed health by 0.23 points (Bockerman and Ilmakunnas, 
2009) and reduces GHQ by between 0.83 and 2.2 units, depending on the GHQ scale (Clark, 
2003; Wildman and Jones; 2002; Flint et al., 2013). This reduction is comparable to the results 
we have presented present here; becoming unemployed is at least as ‘bad’ for health as 
becoming a home owner is ‘good’.  
When considering the mechanisms behind our results, our models suggest that these operate 
via the labour markets with new job opportunities (conditional on a fixed household location), 
extra time saved travelling and resources available for (healthy) leisure activities. We also find 
evidence to suggest that those who go onto become owners are less likely to have unhealthy 
behaviours (such as smoking) and less likely to suffer from cardiovascular and respiratory 
conditions. Those who become owners are also more likely to buy health insurance and make 
fewer visits to their GP.  
There are several limitations to our analysis. First, we have only looked at the benefits to the 
people who were eligible and our findings do not constitute a full population evaluation. 
Second, we do not know whether those individuals who were eligible for the Right to Buy 
scheme and then went onto become an owner took advantage of the scheme. Third, we have 
considered home ownership as the main effect of the Right to Buy policy. This can be thought 
of as the ‘extensive’ margin. It may be interesting to consider the ‘intensive’ margin and look 
at the wealth (and/or income) effects alongside home ownership but we cannot do so with the 
data available.  
Our finding that home ownership has a positive impact on health, might support initiatives such 
as the Affordable Homes Programme being implemented in the UK. Our results support Buck 
et al. (2016) suggesting that population health cannot be improved by the National Health 
Service (NHS) alone and that appropriate housing policies, such as affordable housing, can 
support health policies (NHS England, 2014). Also, because we find that some mechanisms 
operate via reduced travelling time and extra time spent on healthy leisure activities, 
improvements in the infrastructure and transport system that reduce travelling time might also 
be beneficial to health. More widely, our findings support the idea that, as health is determined 
by wider socio-economic factors, non-health policies can impact on health. 
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Appendix A: Further details on data 
A.1 Macro-level data 
Table A1 presents information on the data, along with its source, used in the macro (LAD)-
level analysis.  
Table A1: Description of data used in the macro-level analysis 
Variable Definition Source 
Home ownership 
rate 
The proportion of people in a LAD who report that 
they own (outright or through a mortgage) their 
home 
Authors derivations from LFS data. 
The variable we use is ‘TEN1'. a 
RtB Sales The number of houses sold through the RtB 
scheme in each LAD 
Department for Communities and 
Local Government (DCLG). Table 
685, available online. b  
RtB maximum 
discount 
The maximum available RtB discount in each 
LAD 
Email communication from DCLG. 
% of population who 
report having a 
longstanding health 
condition  
The average number of people who report having 
a longstanding health condition (LHC) in a LAD. 
A LHC is defined as lasting more than 12 
months. 
Authors derivations from LFS data. 
The variable we use is ‘LNGLIM’. c  
Average number of 
(self-reported) 
health conditions 
The average number of self-reported health 
conditions individuals in a LAD have. 
Authors derivations from LFS data. 
Individuals are shown a list of 
conditions and indicate all that 
they have.  
% who are 
economically active 
The percentage of the LAD population who report 
they are economically active (including the 
employed and the unemployed who are actively 
seeking work). 
NOMIS. d  
Median hours 
worked per week 
The median number of hours worked by an 
individual per week in a LAD. 
NOMIS. d 
Median weekly pay The median weekly salary received by an 
individual in a LAD (deflated using the RPI with 
2008 as the base year). 
NOMIS. d 
Population size The total size of the LAD; all ages.  NOMIS. d 
% of population who 
are aged 65 years 
and older 
The proportion of individuals in an LAD who are 
aged 65 years and above. 
NOMIS. d 
   
Notes:  
a: we define owners as responses (1) owned outright and (2) being bought with a mortgage or loan. 
b: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-social-housing-sales   
c: we are aware that this variable changed in Spring 2000 (in that it was asked to more individuals; previous to 
this it was limited to individuals of working age only, whereas after spring 2000 it was asked to all respondents 
of working age or those aged 75 and under and first contact or those aged 75 and over and are not too 
ill/distressed to continue) and again in Spring 2013 (being replaced with ‘LNGLST'). However, these changes 
do not affect our time frame of consideration (2003 – 2010). 
d: NOMIS is the Office for national Statistics (ONS) official labour market statistics portal – see 
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/  
 
 
Table A2 presents regression output from models where we examine for associations between 
the maximum value of the Right to Buy discount cap and local levels of health.  
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Table A2: Local Authority District level models of the relationship between the maximum Right 
to Buy discount cap and other factors 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Pooled  Fixed-effects Pooled with one period lag 
Rate of people with LHC 5.528 7.150 3.135 
 (6.447) (4.953) (7.692) 
    
Average no. of health probs. 0.845 1.418 2.207 
 (2.146) (1.599) (2.652) 
    
% of population aged 65+ 0.792*** 1.165* 0.969*** 
 (0.146) (0.486) (0.175) 
    
Median weekly pay (deflated) 0.008 -0.002 0.010 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
    
Median hours worked per week -0.397 0.011 -0.405 
 (0.229) (0.201) (0.268) 
    
% of population economically active 0.069 -0.033 0.096 
 (0.052) (0.038) (0.068) 
    
% of population with no qualifications 0.063 0.044 0.089 
 (0.049) (0.044) (0.058) 
    
Crime rate per 1,000 population   -0.086*** 0.122*** -0.102*** 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.017) 
    
2001 Census information Yes No Yes 
    
    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations (N*T) 2161 2161 1866 
Sample includes initial public renters only, 2003 – 2010. We have information on N=311 LADs. Standard errors in 
parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. information from the 2001 Census includes: % of properties owned 
outright, % of properties owned with a mortgage, % of property socially rented, % of properties privately rented, and 
IMD rank of median LSOA in LAD. LHC=longstanding health condition (lasting at least 12 months); IMD=index of 
multiple deprivation, LAD=local authority district; LSOA=lower super output area. 
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A.2 Individual level data in the BHPS 
A2.1 Socioeconomic and demographic variables at the individual level  
As well as detailed housing information, the BHPS contains a wealth of information about the 
demographic characteristics and socioeconomic position of each respondent, including 
gender, age, marital status, highest educational qualification attained, number of people who 
live in the household, and equivalised monthly household income. We use age in years (and 
its squared value). Gender is self-reported, and we include a dummy variable equal to one if 
the respondent replies they are male, zero otherwise. We use information on present legal 
marital status (“What is your current legal marital status, are you…” and a list of nine options 
is given), creating a dummy variable equal to one if the response is either married (including 
cohabiting) or in a civil partnership, zero otherwise. For education, we use a question which 
asks about highest academic qualification, and we create three dummy variables: one for 
university level education (including undergraduate and postgraduate), one for college level 
qualifications (including A-levels), and one for school level qualifications. The omitted category 
is ‘no qualifications’.   
There is consistent international evidence that amongst the dimensions of socioeconomic 
status education is the key determinant of health (Cutler et al., 2008; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 
2010). We consider the highest educational attainment because it appears to be the strongest 
predictor of mortality rather than years of schooling which might capture individuals repeating 
school (Clark and Royer, 2013).  
For income, we use a measure of total household weekly net income, which has been 
equivalised (using the OECD equivalence scale) and deflated for inflation. This is a derived 
variable (hhnetde2) available in the BHPS Derived Current and Net Household Income 
Variables dataset.  To generate monthly income data, we multiply the value by 52 and then 
divide by 12. We additionally use information on the number of people who live in the 
household, which we include as a continuous variable.  
The relationship between family size and health is ambiguous. On the one hand, according to 
the quantity-quality model an increase in family size is associated with unhealthier children 
because family size is an input in the health production function and the cost of investing and 
increasing the health of children increases with the size of the family (Becker and Lewis, 1973). 
On the other hand, empirical evidence finds the opposite, suggesting that in smaller families 
children are less exposed to diseases and this in turn weakens the development of their 
immune system (Karmaus and Botezan, 2002; Bevier et al., 2011). The spousal health 
literature suggests an ambiguous relation between individual health and that of her partner. 
On the one hand, “social contagion’’ implies that individual outcomes change the marginal 
utility of the partner’s actions. Social comparisons between spouses, for example, attenuate 
the negative impact of unhealthy outcomes (i.e. weight). However, the healthcare needs that 
these outcomes require might incentivise the partner to improve her health. Using German 
panel data Clark and Etilé (2011) find evidence supporting the social contagion hypothesis. 
However, this is not to be interpreted as causal evidence because of the lack of exogenous 
variation in spousal health. We consider the total number of people in the household 
comprising both adults and children. 
 
A2.2 Labour, leisure and housing costs 
In the mechanisms analyses, we consider several labour market and leisure outcomes. We 
define “employed” as a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is employed or self-
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employed, zero otherwise, including unemployed and retired. For those respondents who are 
in work, we consider working time which indicates the number of hours worked per week and 
commuting time which is the number of minutes spent travelling to work, one-way per day. 
BHPS respondents are asked the amount (in pound sterling) of expenditure on leisure 
activities per month from an eleven point-interval list of values ranging from under £10 to £160 
or over.  We take the midpoint value of each interval and treat this variable as continuous. We 
also consider the housing costs that a BHPS respondent incurs for either mortgage or renting. 
We make use of the BHPS derived variable “xphsn” which is defined as “net monthly mortgage 
or rent costs. For renters who receive housing benefit, either partial or complete, includes the 
rent after the rebate. Variable is zero for houses rent free or owned outright”.  As a robustness 
check, we compute similar variables ourselves, based on reported rent and mortgage 
payments, and the results were very similar.  
 
A2.3 Social capital 
For the analysis of social mechanisms, we take a broad definition of social capital and consider 
measures of political and social participation, and of satisfaction. Although the BHPS is rich in 
measures of social activity and political participation, our choice of variables is restricted to 
those that were available across many years and that displayed sufficient variation in our 
sample of interest. We define “vote” as a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent 
supports a particular party. The variable “Talk to neighbours” is a dummy that equals one if 
the respondent talks to neighbours at least once or twice a week. “Satisfaction with home” is 
a score that indicates how satisfied the respondent is with her home and it goes from one (not 
satisfied at all) to seven (completely satisfied). 
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A.3 First stage output  
Table A3: First Stage model of hypothetical Right to Buy discount on ownership 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect# 
      
   
Calculated RtB disc./1000 0.0266*** 0.002*** 
 (0.006) (0.0003) 
   
Time lived at property (years) -0.0184*** -0.001*** 
 (0.008) (0.0004) 
   
Log(average LAD house price) -1.139*** -0.081*** 
 (0.164) (0.0088) 
   
Socioeconomic Characteristics a Yes Yes 
   
Year dummies Yes Yes 
   
Observations 6430 6430 
Sample includes initial social renters only, 2000 – 2008. Coefficients displayed.  Bootstrapped standard errors, based on 2,000 
replications, in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
a: additional controls include: sex, age, age squared, log of monthly household income, marital status, and educational attainment.  
#: Marginal effects calculated at the means of independent variables. 
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Appendix B: Remaining robustness checks 
B.1 Robustness checks for main analysis  
B.1.1 How to calculate the estimated value of a rented property 
In the reduced specification of the house price equation, the coefficient on local average house 
prices is 1.25 (standard error = 0.011; t-statistic = 115.66). This is larger than the 
corresponding coefficient in the full model (0.94; first row of Table C.1 in Appendix C). The 
adjusted R-squared of the model with only local average house prices is 24%, compared to 
the adjusted R-squared in the full model of 65%. 
In Figure B1 we show the relationship between the two predictions, and we see this is upward 
sloping and close to the 45-degree line. However, there is some variability, and in Figure B2 
we plot the distribution of the predicted values from the full model (grey bars with no lines) and 
the reduced model (clear bars with black lines). For graphical quality, we have censored the 
upper tail at £1,000,000. This figure shows that the two distributions are quite similar, with the 
reduced model’s predictions being slightly to the right of the full model’s, on average. This 
indicates, as in Benítez-Silva et al. (2015), that the value of cheaper properties is over-
estimated compared to the average price in the same LAD.  
When turning to the results of the second stage equation, in panel (a) of Table B1 we observe 
that how we predict house prices for public renters makes very little qualitative difference in 
that the sign and significance is the same. The magnitude of the coefficients is also quite 
similar.  
 
B.1.2 Exclude income 
When we remove income from the set of control variables (panel (b), Table B1) we observe 
that the main result holds true; home ownership is good for health. However, the magnitude 
of the relationship is slightly smaller for all three health measures when we exclude income.  
 
B.1.3 Consider the head of household and non-head of household separately 
In our data, we have 4,185 observations on 858 individuals who are classified as being the 
head of household (as defined in the BHPS. The BHPS definition of the head of household is 
defined as the principal owner or renter of the property, and (where there is more than one), 
the eldest taking precedence.).  The results for GHQ and the number of conditions are 
qualitatively the same as the main results (columns (2) and (3), panel (c) of Table B1). 
However, when we consider self-assessed health as the outcome, we observe no statistically 
significant effect.  
We additionally have 2,245 observations on 598 individuals who are classified as not being 
the head of household. (Note that the number of observations between the two subsample 
(4185+2245) sums to the full sample (6430). However, the number of individuals in the two 
subsamples (858+598=1456) is larger than the overall number of observations (1204). This is 
due to the fact that head of household is not stable over time; for example, an individual maybe 
the head of household in one wave, but not the next.) For the non-heads (panel (d) of Table 
B1) we observe consistently larger health benefits than reported in the main results (Table 3) 
and for the subsample of heads of household. We attribute this to the fact that the decision to 
become a home owner may have been exogenously imposed upon the non-heads by the 
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head. It is also possible to imagine that non-heads face less financial pressure, and hence 
enjoy living in an owned home more.   
 
B.1.4 Consider only people who are employed when first observed 
We have information on 527 individuals (2,790 observations) who meet our definition of being 
initially employed. The results based on this sample are qualitatively similar to the main results 
(panel (e) of Table B1); we observe the same sign and statistical significance. The effects on 
self-assessed health and the number of conditions are slightly smaller, but larger for GHQ in 
this sub-sample. We therefore conclude that our main results are not being driven by the policy 
being taken up more by individuals in employment compared to individuals who are 
unemployed or retired.  
 
B1.5 Function form of second stage 
Given that self-assessed health is technically an ordinal variable, we estimate marginal effects 
following an ordered logit regression (Table B2), where we observe for both the one- and two-
stage models, that ownership increases the probability of being in the top two responses 
(excellent and very good) and reduces the probability of being in the bottom three classes 
(good, fair, and poor). We prefer the two-stage results, due to the significance of the first-stage 
residual in the second stage outcome model. 
B.2 Robustness checks for mechanisms  
Some of the potential mechanisms we explore above could be interpreted as an individual 
owning a different house to the one they previously rented (e.g. the garden mechanism and 
changes in commuting time). To attempt to establish if the individual bought the house they 
were renting (and hence more likely to exploit the Right to Buy scheme), we perform a final 
robustness check. Through a special license version of the BHPS, we are able to obtain the 
Lower Super Output Area (LSOA) of each respondent. LSOAs are small levels of 
administrative geography based on the 2001 Census. Each LSOA contains approximately 
1,500 individuals. For the purpose of this robustness check, we assume that if an individual 
does not change their LSOA throughout their time in the sample, then they have not moved 
house. Moves within an LSOA are uncommon due to their small size. Based on this constant 
LSOA assumption, our sample reduces from N= 1204 [NT=6430] to N=983 (82%) [NT=3908; 
61\%]. We then repeat the analysis on this subsample, and the results are reported in Table 
B3. We observe that the results are essentially the same in terms of direction and statistical 
significance. We have additionally performed robustness checks on variables we infer could 
also be proxies for constant household location and the results remain robust (available from 
the authors on request). We therefore conclude that our results are not impacted upon by 
people moving to (and buying) houses other than the ones they were previously renting; that 
is, we can make stronger clams regarding the likely impact of the Right to Buy scheme. 
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Figures and Tables for Appendix B 
Figure B1: The relationship between the two predicted values: full model and reduced 
model 
 
Source: authors’ representation from BHPS data 1999-2008.  
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Figure B2: Comparing the distribution of predicted house values 
 
 
Source: authors’ representation from BHPS data 1999-2008. For graphical clarity, we censor the observations at 
£1,000,000. 
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Table B1: Second-stage models of physical and psychological health 
outcomes for remaining robustness checks 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Outcome: SAH GHQ #Probs 
  Model: 2SRI OLS 2SRI OLS 2SRI Nbreg 
     
Panel (a)  Being a home owner 0.194** 1.429*** -0.658*** 
Only LAD averages  (0.082) (0.489) (0.114) 
in house price 
prediction     
N=1204; NT=6430 First stage residual  0.019*** -0.353** 0.076** 
  (0.003) (0.156) (0.034) 
          
     
Panel (b) Being a home owner 0.159* 1.260** -0.543*** 
Exclude income  (0.095) (0.565) (0.086) 
N=1204; NT=6430     
 First stage residual  0.032 -0.274 0.092*** 
  (0.032) (0.191) (0.026) 
          
     
Panel (c)  Being a home owner 0.095 1.931*** -0.664*** 
Head of Household  (0.102) (0.604) (0.147) 
N=858; NT=4185     
 First stage residual  -0.0220 -0.560*** 0.081** 
  (0.031) (0.185) (0.040) 
          
     
Panel (d) Being a home owner 0.360** 2.595*** -0.704*** 
Non-Head of Household  (0.153) (0.934) (0.178) 
N=598; NT=2245     
 First stage residual  -0.0120 -0.806** 0.122** 
  (0.0027) (0.339) (0.061) 
          
     
Panel (e)  Being a home owner 0.083*** 2.955*** -0.340* 
Initial Employees  (0.015) (0.939) (0.179) 
N=527; NT=2790     
 First stage residual  -0.044*** -1.096*** 0.047 
  (0.006) (0.387) (0.074) 
          
Each panel contains a separate second stage model. Sample includes initial public renters only, 2000 – 2008. 
Number of observations (NT) and individuals (N) is shown in each panel. Bootstrapped standard errors, based 
on 2,000 replications, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Column (3) reports marginal effects, from second stage models, calculated at the means of independent 
variables. The models contain all additional variables as reported in Table 3.  
SAH=self-assessed health; GHQ=General Health Questionnaire; #Probs.=Number of self-reported health 
conditions. OLS=ordinary least squares; 2SRI = two-stage residual inclusion; Nbreg = negative binomial 
regression. 
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Table B2: Marginal Effects following Second Stage models of physical and psychological health 
outcomes, treating self-assessed health and ordinal and applying an ordered logit model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    SAH=1 SAH=2 SAH=3 SAH=4 SAH=5 
Panel (a): One stage 
model       
 
Being a home owner -0.0166*** -0.0437*** -0.0526*** 0.0633*** 0.0495*** 
 
 (0.0028) (0.0072) (0.0086) (0.0104) (0.0080) 
              
Panel (b): Two stage 
model       
 
Being a home owner -0.0107* -0.0283* -0.0340* 0.0409* 0.0320* 
 
 (0.0058) (0.0153) (0.0183) (0.0221) (0.0173) 
 
      
 
      
 
First stage residual  -0.0021*** -0.0057*** -0.0068*** 0.0082*** 0.0064*** 
 
 (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006) 
  
      
Marginal effects calculated at the means of independent variables. The models contain all additional variables as reported in 
Table 3. Sample includes initial social renters only, 2000 – 2008.  Bootstrapped standard errors, based on 2,000 replications, in 
parentheses.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table B3: Second Stage models of physical and psychological health outcomes 
for subsample of individuals with constant LSOA residence  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Outcome: SAH GHQ #Probs 
Model:  2SRI OLS 2SRI OLS 2SRI Nbreg 
    
Being a home owner 0.155** 2.243*** -0.491*** 
 (0.066) (0.725) (0.126) 
    
First stage residual  0.048 -0.477*** 0.050* 
 (0.031) (0.183) (0.028) 
        
Sample includes initial public renters (N=983; NT=3908) who keep the same LSOA of residence throughout their 
time in the sample only, 2000 – 2008. Bootstrapped standard errors, based on 2,000 replications, in parentheses. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In column (3), marginal effects, from second stage models, calculated at the means 
of independent variables are presented. The models contain all additional variables as reported in Table 3. 
 
Table B4: Linear model of whether baseline health predicts the decision to later 
become and owner 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Self-assessed health -0.00108 0.00370   
 (0.011) (0.009)   
     
GHQ Score 0.00130  0.00138  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  
     
Number of health problems -0.00202   -0.00339 
 (0.008)   (0.007) 
     
Socioeconomic Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Locality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1204 1204 1204 1204 
Robust standard errors, clustered at local authority district level, included in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
Sample is all individuals when first observed. Outcome variable =1 if individual i later goes on to own their house; =0 if 
always a renter.  
Additional control variables are as reported in Table 3 (notes a and c). The results are also robust to including 
household characteristics.   
The models are estimated using OLS for ease of interpretation. We have repeated using a logit model, and the 
resulting marginal effects are qualitatively similar to those presented above.  
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Appendix C: How good are house price estimations 
The R-squared in the house price prediction model (Eq. 6) is just under 65%. In Table C1 we 
present selected coefficients to demonstrate that they behave as expected. For example, we 
can see that property value increases as the number of rooms within the property increases, 
and that all property types are less expensive than detached properties. Also, the predicted 
value increases with the council-tax band. These coefficients allow us to be confident in our 
house price imputation equation. (Full coefficients are available on request.)  
 
In Figure C1 we plot the predicted house values (panel a) and the actual values reported by 
owners (panel b). The distributions of predicted and real values are similar, and this is 
confirmed in Figure C2 where we plot the predicted residuals. These residuals are normally 
distributed, with mean close to zero. The actual values display some clumping at £5,000 
intervals. 
 
In Figure C5 we present a scatter plot of land registry reported average house prices in LADs 
(x-axis) against our within-sample predicted averages (y-axis). If our predictions were perfect, 
we would expect all of the observations to lie on the 45-degree (grey, dashed) line. However, 
we can see that the actual relationship (black, solid line) is slightly above this, but that overall 
our approximations are quite good. The relationship is: average predicted values = constant 
+ 1.07*(land registry averages), and the t-value on the 1.07 is 71.70, indicating it is strongly 
significant. However, we can also reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficient is equal 
to one (t-value 4.94), implying whilst the relationship is close to unity, it is not equal to it.   
 
Note Figure C3 is based on our estimation sample, whereas Figures C1 and C2 are based on 
owners only (i.e. out-of-sample). Figure C3 can be thought of as a test of whether predicted 
values of rented houses are the same as sold houses. 
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Figure C1: Predicted and reported house values 
 
Source: Authors' representation from BHPS data 1999-2008. For graphical clarity, we censor the observations at 
£1,000,000. 
 
Figure C2: Examining the goodness of predicted house values: predicted residuals 
 
Source: Authors' representation from BHPS data 1999-2008. 
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Figure C3: Examining the goodness of predicted house values: local authority district 
average prices 
 
Source: Authors' representation from BHPS data 1999-2008 (y-axis) and Halifax and Land Registry data (x-axis). 
For graphical clarity, we censor the observations at £1,000,000. 
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Table C1: Selected output from the hedonic house price equation 
 Coefficient   Std. Error   
Local average house prices 0.94*** 0.01 
Number of rooms: 1 Reference category  
Number of rooms: 2 33682.62** 14425.1 
Number of rooms: 3 86025.43*** 15701.5 
Number of rooms: 4 127422.40*** 17861.8 
Number of rooms: 5 171141.30*** 20585.7 
Number of rooms: 6 224716.30*** 23718.4 
Number of rooms: 7 287368.40*** 27162.6 
Number of rooms: 8 343803.40*** 30809.8 
Number of rooms: 9 392865.60*** 34507.7 
Number of rooms: 10 635098.90*** 38751.2 
Number of rooms: >10 a Included  
Type of accommodation: detached    Reference category. 
Type of accommodation: Semi-detached    -12676.18** 5448.71 
Type of accommodation: End-Terrace    -16062.47** 8968.31 
Type of accommodation: Terrace    -45912.85*** 7109.76 
Type of accommodation: Purpose built flat    -58109.84*** 16059.2 
Type of accommodation: Converted flat    -49361.92*** 17839.6 
Council tax band: A    Reference category  
Council tax band: B    1895.92 2149.46 
Council tax band: C    10447.62*** 2199.59 
Council tax band: D    20214.81*** 2301.62 
Council tax band: E    41516.69*** 2715.82 
Council tax band: F    73290.57*** 3206 
Council tax band: G    171740.90*** 3471.27 
Council tax band: H    283549.70*** 6319.64 
Other household characteristics b  Yes 
Bootstrapped standard errors, clustered at local authority level and based on 2,000 replications, in parentheses.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
a: We included the number of rooms up to 20. The coefficients are all monotonically increasing, and statistically 
significant at p<0.001.  
 
b: Other controls include the central heating fuel type, if there is a separate toilet/bathroom, if the kitchen is open-
plan, if there is a garden/terrace, if there is an indoor toilet, if there are neighbourhood problems with either 
crime/vandalism and/or pollution/the environment.  We additionally interact the number of rooms with property 
type. The coefficient sizes and significance levels are available on request. We omit them here due to reasons of 
brevity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
